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I. GORDON TULLOCK
Public choice says, fairly unambiguously, that democracy has
poorly run foreign policy. One of the oldest discoveries made regard-
ing public choice is that voters who give much thought to their polit-
ical choices will be poorly informed. Anthony Downs, in his book An
Economic Theory of Democracy,I first introduced this problem. In my
book, Toward A Mathematics of Politics,2 I expanded this idea and
invented the term "rational-ignorance." 3 Although I will forego the
mathematics here, I recommend my book over Downs' because I use
high school algebra, and he uses calculus. Another problem that I
will discuss is that the basic motive of most elected people, whether it
is the President or a Congressman, is to be re-elected. A famous aph-
orism correctly observes that in order to be a great Senator, it is first
of all necessary to be a Senator. Nobody in either the Legislature or
the White House ever forgets that.
* Godfrey Hodgson is a freelance writer specializing in United States politics and
contemporary history. He is currently working on a television biography of President Ronald
Reagan and a biography of Henry L. Stimson.
** Irving Kristol is John M. Olin Distinguished Fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute in Washington, D.C. and Co-Editor of The Public Interest Magazine.
*** Gordon Tullock is Karl Eller Professor of Economics and Political Science at the
University of Arizona and a Member of the Board of the American Political Science
Association. He is a former President of the Southern Economic Association and the Public
Choice Society.
1. A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238-59 (1957). A thinking
electorate is likely to forego the use of available political information because of strong political
preferences. Id. at 243.
2. G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS (1967).
3. Id. at 102.
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Since the passage of the twenty-second amendment,4 Presidents
in their second term are aware that they will not remain in office
much longer. Nonetheless, they usually think that somehow they will
retain their influence if their party remains in power. Thus, the actual
decisions are made by people who are attempting to please a large
collection of people who are, themselves, very badly informed. This
kind of decisionmaking works out poorly, particularly in foreign
affairs. In some domestic areas, however, this kind of decisionmaking
works out very well, indeed, because people with specialized knowl-
edge about a particular area are the only ones who are interested in it.
Sometimes, however, domestic decisionmaking works out poorly.
It has been observed that people with strong convictions con-
cerning political or international matters are usually not very well
informed. A Greek friend of mine was in London during a large
street demonstration involving Greek politics. Since people demon-
strate about all sorts of things, he saw the event as a research opportu-
nity. He and several assistants went out among the demonstrators
and simply asked them questions about Greece, such as, "Where is
Athens?" Most of the demonstrators knew where Athens was, but
nobody knew where Salonika was. In general, it turned out that these
demonstrators were also unknowledgeable about the reasons for
which they were demonstrating. For them, demonstrating was a type
of entertainment activity.
One mainly observes a tendency towards applying ethical
assumptions to the making of foreign policy without realizing that
different people have different ethics. As it happens, we have in the
world today another country that is very ethical in its foreign policy.
In fact, its current ruler is a professor of moral law. This country is
making a vigorous effort to expand its moral principles throughout
the world. Iran, however, is not popular. In this respect, the United
States is similarly unpopular. When I was in the diplomatic service, I
happened to go only to places where there were friendly governments
in power. These governments regarded the United States as one of
their major international allies and one of their major domestic
problems. Their realizations of our dislike for their domestic policies
led to continuing tension.
I suspect that one of the reasons why the United States is actu-
ally unpopular in most of the world is because we are always trying to
inflict our moral principles on other people. This approach worked
well immediately after World War II; however, it is now working
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (limiting election to the Office of the President to two
terms).
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badly. The reason for the change is that there is no longer any agree-
ment in the United States as to what constitutes good morals. The
conservatives and the liberals are attempting to impose our moral sys-
tem in Nicaragua, yet they disagree as to what that moral system is.
The same was true in Vietnam. In Vietnam, there was a bona fide
difference of opinion as to what was the morally correct decision. No
one became well informed about the matter because there was no
political incentive to do otherwise. I assure you of the mathematical
proof of this assertion. The empirical evidence overwhelmingly con-
firms it. Politicians know that they can do some things that they want
to do, but if they do not do mostly what the voters want, they will not
be with us much longer.
Consequently, this system of decisionmaking does not conduct
foreign policy very well. This conclusion is readily observable if one
reviews American history. For example, our history teachers tell us
about the Tripolitanian War.5 They do not, however, mention the fact
that we lost it. "Millions for defence but not a cent for tribute" was
our slogan.6 We ended up paying a ransom, which, nevertheless,
included paying tribute.7
Our remaining war record reads as follows: We lost the War of
1812. We won the Indian Wars because we outnumbered our oppo-
nents. We won in Mexico because our adversary was such a small
country. We defeated the Spaniards. In World War I and World
War II, we were victorious due to our immense numerical superiority.
And in Korea and Vietnam, we lost two conflicts that ended in com-
promise. The explanation for the last two losses was simply bad man-
agement. In each of these two wars we were infinitely more powerful
than our opponents, but the muddled effort to apply moral principles
led to very unfortunate outcomes. In the case of Vietnam, the after-
math was the death of approximately three million people.
Applying morality in the conduct of foreign affairs produces a
depressing problem. I regret to say that I do not offer any solution.
The alternative form of government, namely despotism, undoubtedly
carries out its foreign policy better than we do. Its objectives, how-
ever, are rarely anything that we would regard as desirable. Despot-
5. Acts of aggression and piracy against American merchant ships by the Barbary States
in the late 1700's sparked the Tripolitanian War. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 104-08
(1832). See also M. SMELSER, THE DEMOCRATIC' REPUBLIC 57-61 (1968) (discussing the
history and conduct of the Tripolitanian War).
6. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 238:4 (2d ed. 1953).
7. According to Thomas Jefferson, the choice rested with Congress whether to re-
establish commerce in the Mediterranean region by the use of war, tribute, or ransom. See
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 5, at 105.
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ism, then, is more efficient than democracy in carrying out
unreasonable and unwanted policies. I have devoted most of my
career to the problem of domestic democracy. I have tried to work
out ways of improving the internal structure of government and, in
turn, our performance in international affairs. I certainly have not yet
succeeded in solving these seemingly intractable problems.
II. GODFREY HODGSON
In every democracy, there is tension between the people who
subjectively see the international scene in terms of their own emo-
tions, wishes, and interests, and the people who confront the con-
straints of reality. The latter group knows more of the world because
they are the ones who are called upon to execute foreign policy.
In the United States, the doctrine of separation of powers adds
an additional dimension to this tension. There has always been what I
might call a tug-of-war. In fact, one could almost call it a "pull devil
pull Baker"" between the Executive and the Legislature. From 1900
until the 1960s, it was generally conceded that it was the function of
the Executive to take the initiative in both foreign policy and national
security. The Executive was subject only to the rather loosely inter-
preted constraints in the Constitution. In the late 1960's, however,
there was an intellectual assault on the notion of the primacy of the
Executive. This assault took place in the context of a general concern
about an overmighty Presidency and a specific concern about the
Vietnam War in Southeast Asia. The challenge was rather like Dun-
ning's resolution in the House of Commons in the 18th century. The
resolution stated: "The power of the Crown has increased, is increas-
ing, and ought to be diminished." 9 In the late 1960's, the Congress
began to similarly say that the power of the President had increased,
was increasing, and ought to be diminished.
Since 1981, the Executive has fought back. The question now,
however, is whether the Iran-Contra affair represents another stop-
ping point against which the pendulum will butt and swing back, or
whether it represents only a brief interruption in that movement.
This tension is important to understanding that presently this conflict
is not merely binary, a tug-of-war, or a zero-sum game. Rather, it
exists within an extremely complex equilibrium of multiple forces that
8. B. WHITING, EARLY AMERICAN PROVERBS AND PROVERBIAL PHRASES 105:D140
(1977). The reference, of course, is to Senator Howard Baker-the only man in history who
has been both Senate Majority Leader and White House Chief of Staff.
9. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 20:24 (2d ed. 1953).
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is not unlike a special version of the old game musical chairs. In this
version, every time the music stops, another player joins the game.
I recently spoke to a Democratic Congressman who was making
some capital of the fact that the House had managed to intrude into
the discussion concerning a possible arms control treaty by using its
financial authority. It then occurred to me that we now had 535 play-
ers on the Hill confronting at last eight executive agencies, not all of
them, by any means, united. In many cases, individual staff members,
as well as individual members of the Congress, have their own foreign
policies and are taking a hand in the Washington foreign policy game.
The result is a game that is increasingly neither consultative, nor hier-
archical, in structure. Thus, the foreign policy game is essentially
transactional. All the players enter the market to transact business
and attempt to increase their transferable political capital by the way
the game is carried out.
Most foreign policy issues in the United States are closed polit-
ical issues. These issues are like the iron triangles of political science
theory. They are small matters that most people can afford to leave to
others, such as small groups of Congressmen and their staffs, a hand-
ful of people in the executive branch who are directly concerned, and
American interest groups and foreign countries that are directly
affected.
A crucial dimension in policymaking is measured in the process
whereby small, closed political issues become major national issues,
upon which Congress must take a stand and that demand attention
from the White House. There are only a small number of issues at
any one time that make that transition from the closed rock pool of
closed politics to the stormy ocean of a national issue. The longest
journey is not from Brooklyn to Manhattan, but from the back burner
to the front burner. The crucial agent in sending closed issues on the
journey to national attention is the media. In this context, it is not
necessarily the opinions of any particular part of the media that mat-
ter, but rather, the fact that this game has come to be played out in
the forum of the media.
As a result, we are in a situation in which there are alternative
temptations. One is the Bismarckian temptation, and the other is the
neo-populist temptation. The Bismarckians are those, metaphorically
speaking, who would like to clothe themselves in long, fur-collared
overcoats and make cold pragmatic decisions on the basis of power
and secrecy.10 The problem with the Bismarckians is that they risk
10. See generally B. WALLER, BISMARCK 18, 75-83 (1985) (characterizing Bismarck's
1988]
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the danger of failing to carry public opinion with them. On the other
hand, the populists, who are able to generate the steam of public
engagement and commitment, very often risk the opposite danger of
aiming at the wrong target, or at a vanishing target that has already
ceased to exist. Popular emotion is a better cartridge than it is a
foresight.
The manner of addressing these foreign policy issues should not
be to attempt a structural change. Rather, both the Executive and the
Congress should be persuaded to divide the issue between them in the
way that the Constitution provides. It is quite clear that the Execu-
tive was intended to act, and the Congress was intended to scrutinize.
It seems to me that the solution must lie within this structure. Mr.
Sam Rayburn, a Democrat who took the highest view of the powers
of the Congress, once spoke about where the balance between the
Executive and the Congress ought to lie. He said:
When the nation is in danger, you have to follow your leader ....
The man in the White House is the only leader the nation has; if he
doesn't lead or can't lead, then the country has no leader.
Although we may disagree with him, we must follow our President
in times of peril, regardless of which party he belongs to."1
There is something that every successful President has instinc-
tively felt: It is not only the President's job to take the initiative in
foreign policy; rather, it is also his duty to do so in a manner that
carries Congress along with him. He must do this before the point at
which policy turns into action. It is, after all, a government of shared,
not separate, powers. Finally, the President ought to make sure that
he gains the initiative in a manner that withstands careful Congres-
sional scrutiny.
III. IRVING KRISTOL
Four forces shape American foreign policy, and I do not think
that the media is one of them. Impotency strikes the media when
foreign policy succeeds. When foreign policy fails, however, the media
crucifies people and subverts institutions in order to demonstrate its
power over the world. That is the nature of the media, and it is not
going to change.
When America successfully executes a foreign policy, the media
may dislike it, but they have nothing to say. For example, the media
did not like the military invasion of Grenada. Afterwards, there were
view of politics as being a power struggle and describing his realistic and practical approach to
politics).
11. D. HARDEMAN & D. BACON, RAYBURN 100-01 (1987).
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a few stories about how "bollixed up" the invasion was, as if there had
ever been a military invasion that wasn't an absolute, chaotic mess.
The American people, however, paid no attention to the media. I,
therefore, exclude the media from a major role in the making of for-
eign policy.
One of the problems that we have in Washington is that people
do not exclude the media when they contemplate making foreign pol-
icy decisions. They worry about what The Washington Post and NBC
will say. The truth is that if one knows what to do, does it well, and
articulates what one did, then criticisms by the media will be
immaterial.
I will explore the four actors that shape American foreign policy:
the President, the Congress, the State Department, and the American
people. The President is supposed to be essentially in charge of for-
eign policy. The Founding Fathers understood that tyrannies enjoyed
certain advantages over democracies when it came to foreign policy:
Tyrants can move quickly, can suddenly switch allies without any
tedious explanation, do not have to cope with popular scruples, and
are far more agile, supple, and ruthless than democracies.
The advantages that dictatorships or tyrannies have over democ-
racies are all real. The Founders of this republic responded to this
reality by allowing a strong President who would effectively shape
and control foreign policy, with Congress simply "kibitzing" and
blaming the President if things go wrong. In a sense, the function of
Congress is to be present should things go wrong, and hopefully, to
then take the proper corrective action.
Congress, the second actor, is obviously incompetent to cope
with foreign policy. Former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill said,
quite correctly, that "all politics is local [politics]." 2 That is a Con-
gressman speaking. He is stating a congressional viewpoint. Con-
gressmen do not see the world; rather, they see their own restricted,
parochial interests. They respond to what they see. It is not that
Congressman do not know enough. Some of them know an awful lot,
but they disregard that knowledge because their perception and
responsiveness is to local stimuli. Congress should, therefore, act
mostly as a back-seat driver in conducting foreign policy. As a back-
seat driver, Congress can play a useful role, such as supplying advice
when a wrong turn is taken. It remains, however, that it is not the
essential role of Congress to shape foreign policy, and it is certainly
12. T. O'NEILL, JR., MAN OF THE HOUSE 26 (1987).
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not its role to conduct the kind of detailed foreign policy through
which it now exercises its sovereignty.
The third actor that shapes American foreign policy is the State
Department. It is very difficult for people in the Foreign Service to
understand foreign policy. For example, Gordon Tullock, a former
Foreign Service Officer, has never recovered a normal vision of the
world. The reason lies in their training as diplomats. The State
Department is not in the foreign policy business; rather, it is in the
diplomacy business. Although the two functions are related, they are
very different in a crucial respect.
The first rule of foreign policy is to know your friends and your
enemies. Any state department in a democracy has great difficulty
following this rule because any state department, and most certainly
ours, believes that the goal of diplomacy is to keep friends as friends
and to make enemies into friends. They further believe that such a
goal is achievable only if the task is left to the experts in diplomacy.
It is very rare for a state department in any democracy to say: "You
know, diplomacy is hopeless here. We are going to have to go and
beat the [heck] out of this guy." There may be such instances, but
that is not the State Department's normal temper.
The State Department conducts diplomacy reasonably well. I
am impressed with the people I have met in the State Department.
These people are very well informed, very hard working, and sin-
cerely committed to their job, a job that must be accomplished. We
need diplomacy. The problem, however, is that we now have a huge
State Department with some thousands of people comprising a large
bureaucracy. This bureaucracy engages in the business of diplomacy,
not in the business of foreign policy. It is always seeking ways to give
priority to diplomacy over foreign policy. Thus, the State Depart-
ment is a permanent problem in American foreign policy. It is not
going to be reformed. One may, therefore, do what Henry Kissinger
did: Simply leave the diplomats alone, let the Department continue,
and do not attend to it in making foreign policy.
The fourth actor that shapes American foreign policy is the peo-
ple. This is certainly true in our nation's foreign policy, since ours is
such a democratic democracy. I was greatly amused by Gordon Tul-
lock's story about his friend's attendance at a demonstration in
London, in which the protesters knew very little about what they
were protesting against. It does not matter, however, what such dem-
onstrators know or don't know. They know what they know. Most
people know that their world is full of people who may not like them.
The world is full of friends and enemies, and friends should be treated
[Vol. 43:211
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as friends, and enemies should be treated as enemies. There is also a
large neutral group comprising "second cousins." How they treat you
conditions how you treat them in return. Anyone who has been
raised in a family, particularly in a large family, has a basic intuitive
understanding of foreign policy that is uncolored and uncorrupted by
the kind of training one gets in the State Department, or in schools of
international affairs. When it comes to foreign policy, these very pow-
erful simplicities are the strength of the American people. In my
view, therefore, the question in American foreign policy is always
whether a President knows how to rely on these simplicities.
The dynamism in American foreign policy emerges when the
President and the people decide together what is to be done. The
emergence of this dynamism is very simple. The President decides
what must be done, and he relates it to the people along with his
reasons for his actions. If, however, the President simply says what
must be done and then opens a debate, forget it. There are always a
million arguments against doing anything in any situation in foreign
policy. Therefore, the President must decide, then act, since the peo-
ple rally behind action.
Everyone thinks of World War II as a popular war. Initially,
however, the American people had absolutely no desire to become
involved in it. If the Japanese and the Germans had not been foolish
enough to attack us, we never would have entered World War II.
Contrastingly, the initial response to the Korean War was positive.
As the war continued, however, people found it difficult to under-
stand our involvement and our goals. We found it our duty to stop at
something called the Yalu River, but no one knew where the Yalu
River was. People did understand, however, that it was not the kind
of war in which we ought to be involved. Likewise, in Vietnam, the
instincts of the American people were absolutely right again. They
supported the war in Vietnam, until it became clear that the war was
stagnant and those in charge of the conduct of the war were pursuing
an absolutely insane military strategy of gradual escalation or gradu-
ated response. Such a strategy put us permanently on the defensive.
One does not win wars that way.
The notion of graduated response haunts us today in the Persian
Gulf. What did we do when the Iranians shot at a boat with an
American flag? We destroyed two empty oil platforms out in the mid-
dle of the ocean-two empty platforms! We want to conduct war
without losing any of our soldiers, sometimes called "boys" and
"girls," and without hurting any of their soldiers, or, God forbid,
their civilians. We acted in a similarly ridiculous way in the bombing
19881
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of Libya. If one is going to bomb, then bomb. Do not send over just a
few planes and drop just a few bombs. As it happened, those few
bombs seemed to have had a considerable effect. I really do believe,
however, that twice as many would have had a greater effect.
Presidential action in foreign policy is the key to a successful pol-
icy. We must, however, make allowances for circumstances. We
have had, in my opinion, only two Presidents in this century who
have been successful in foreign policy. They were both Roosevelts:
Theodore and Franklin. Franklin Roosevelt served during a particu-
larly difficult period of history. As a President of abasically isolation-
ist country, he wanted to get us into World War II in support of
Britain and the West. Franklin lied, deceived, and was utterly Machi-
avellian as he maneuvered us into a position that invited Japan to
attack us and provoked Hitler. That is not a normal state of affairs. I
do not like what Franklin Roosevelt did, but he acted for good reason.
I am not sure that the goal was achievable by any other means. Theo-
dore Roosevelt, however, is a much better and more timely model of a
successful foreign policy actor. Theodore Roosevelt waved a big stick
but never invaded anything. It was never necessary precisely because
everyone understood that he would if he had to.
It is important for a President to understand that we have a
country that is divided. All democracies are divided. We are divided
by regions, economics, ethnicity, religion, and race. An active foreign
policy is the one thing that is always capable of uniting the people,
and therefore, it is very important. It is especially important today
that we once again achieve an active foreign policy. If we are to pur-
sue such a policy, we must persuade the Pentagon that its job is to
sometimes fight, rather than to just glower. Ten years ago, I urged
the Defense Department to change its name back to the War Depart-
ment, so they would have some notion of their mission. For a similar
reason, I dislike the isolationist phrase "national security." In any
case, I hope we will soon have a President who understands that the
dynamics of American foreign policy are between the President and
the American people, and that the other actors that shape foreign pol-
icy do not matter when these dynamics are correct.
IV. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
SPEAKER: I agree with Irving Kristol that in military actions,
such as the bombing raid on Libya, one acts and then accepts the
consequence of public reaction to the policy. There are policy areas,
[Vol. 43:211
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however, such as Nicaragua, disarmament, the INF treaty,1 3 and the
space shield, that involve more protracted conflicts. It is very difficult
for the Executive to act quickly in these areas and, thereby, marshal
public support. The fact that our negotiating adversaries have access
to the American and allied media and we cannot wage war in the
Soviet media compounds this difficulty. Notwithstanding the pro-
tracted time line on which these particular matters are taking place, is
there an appropriate way that the President can pursue Mr. Kristol's
suggestion of acting first and gaining public support afterwards as a
consequence of the action?
MR. KRISTOL: Obviously, there are times when the need to
act does not warrant military action, but action is required neverthe-
less. With regard to the Soviet Union, I have always been very sim-
ple-minded. The American people are correctly simple-minded to the
degree that they believe nasty behavior by the Soviet Union toward us
deserves nasty behavior in response. Unfortunately, there is no
department in government that figures out how to behave nastily
toward the Soviet Union.
We should behave nicely toward the Soviets to the degree that
they behave nicely toward us. We live in a nuclear age, and we want
to avoid going to war with the Soviet Union. I assume that the Sovi-
ets do not want to go to war with us. The need to act, therefore, is
simply a matter of finding an appropriate response in our relations
with them. An appropriate response to an enemy is usually an over-
response. If the Soviets are nasty, we should be nasty-plus. If they
are nice-well, we should be nice.
Nicaragua is a different case. In Nicaragua, we should have
taken military action, but did not. This period of inaction is a mistake
going back many years. We simply should have told the Nicaraguans
that their desire to have socialism in their country is their affair and
that they would be let alone, even if they have communism in their
miserable little country. We should have told them, however, that
they could not accept Soviet military assistance, Soviet or East Euro-
pean or Cuban technicians, Soviet bases, or a Soviet alliance. We
should have told the Nicaraguans to isolate themselves from the
Soviet Union and to "Finlandize"' 14 themselves, vis-a-vis the United
States. In such a case, we would not intervene militarily. Insisting,
13. US-USSR Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, S. Ex. REP. No. 15, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
14. See Garfinkle, "Finlandization ": A Map to a Metaphor, 24 FOREIGN POL'Y RES. INST.
5 (1978). Finlandization refers to "the label given to the inchoate process whereby the
countries of Western Europe-including members of NATO- gradually lose their military
capabilities, economic vitality and political will-power and, stripped of allies, are slowly
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
however, on existing as a client state of the Soviet Union would
require American military intervention. All of the foregoing should
have been declared and done openly, instead of establishing the Con-
tras and placing ourselves in this very complex and drawnout crisis.
The President could have acted on his own if military intervention
was necessary. The intervention would have taken maybe one or two
weeks. Now, such a policy would probably be more difficult to
implement.
There was a strong case for giving the Nicaraguan government
an ultimatum, followed if necessary by military action. There are
other cases, however, of neither war nor peace. Characterizations of
other nations' regimes are really immaterial, as long as people and
nations understand that if they behave well towards us, we will
respond with good behavior toward them. The problem of a proper
response is thus easily solved if nations behave well towards us. We
only have problems when nations behave nastily towards us, such as
when they vote against us at the United Nations. It was difficult, to
say the least, for Jeanne Kirkpatrick and her staff to attempt to per-
suade the State Department to tell countries voting against us on
important issues that we would insist that those countries pay a price
on some other issue. The State Department adamantly refused to
accept such a conception of its role. Therefore, we come once again
to the simplicities in viewing relationships that can be very helpful in
guiding us in most of these areas.
SPEAKER: What can be done about nipping in the bud the
growing tendency, not only among Congressmen, but among Gover-
nors and Mayors to interfere in issues of foreign policy?
MR. HODGSON: Anyone running for office in our transac-
tional world, whether he is a Congressman, Governor, or Mayor, will
address any foreign policy issue when they see any advantage for
themselves in doing so.
transformed into isolated, neutralized states, fearful of Soviet might and unable to resist
Russian desiderata." Id.
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